When approaching Sarah Kofman's work on Friedrich Nietzsche, one is struck by the very personal quality of the relation she forms with her subject through writing. In fact, it might be said that from her book-length studies of Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud to her short discourses about her childhood and her dreams, her writings are as personal as they are philosophical.
When approaching Sarah Kofman's work on Friedrich Nietzsche, one is struck by the very personal quality of the relation she forms with her subject through writing. In fact, it might be said that from her book-length studies of Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud to her short discourses about her childhood and her dreams, her writings are as personal as they are philosophical. 1 The personal interpenetrates the philosophical, and vice versa, because for her the two could not properly be separated. Kofman recognized that, like all philosophers, she did philosophy for her own reasons-that her writings were motivated by a vital interest, and psychological need.
2 When approaching the work of another, she evokes material from the philosopher's life so as to gently illuminate the inconsistencies and commitments of the philosophy. The capricious coexistence of the philosophical and life narratives is precisely her object, such that philosophical interpretation merges with autobiography. Instead of detracting from the philosophical importance of her work, I argue that it enhances it, because her attempt to balance the personal and philosophical-or more precisely, to reflect each through the other-brings into focus the relation of life to philosophy and writing.
Moreover, as a writer for whom Nietzsche and Freud were dominant influences, her relation to the text she reads-and its formative effect upon her identity-is perhaps the key theme of her work, and we can understand her texts even as meditations upon this issue. 3 In what follows, I show how an understanding of Kofman's very particular interpretation of Nietzsche can be supplemented by reading her autobiography. of interest is the manner in which Kofman can be seen to manage anxiety about herself-particularly her Jewish identity-by means of her interpretation of Nietzsche. I argue that, because of his equivocal use of the trope of the Jew, Nietzsche became for Kofman a figure through which she could negotiate her own conflicted identification with Judaism. Her need to do so is expressed in her autobiographical work, in particular Rue Ordener, Rue Labat, which addresses a period of her childhood when care for her was divided between her Jewish mother and a Parisian Gentile. I attempt to synthesize Kofman's philosophical and autobiographical writings with reference to Melanie Klein's "feminization" of psychoanalytic theory, with the centrality she awards the maternal figure in the child's development. Kofman herself suggests such a reading, by arranging her own life narrative in Kleinian terms, with respect to the "good" and "bad" mothers of her childhood.
I will first consider Kofman's reading of Nietzsche's autobiography, Ecce Homo, in Explosions, before turning to an examination of her own autobiographical work, Rue Ordener, Rue Labat. at issue in both of these texts is the concept of the fantasized genealogy whereby Nietzsche and Kofman each identifies whatever they would like to repudiate-all "bad" or polluting objects-with their mother. For Nietzsche this fantasy attempts to conceal his connection to parochial German crassness, and, according to Kofman, the anti-Semitism that taints his name. Conversely, Kofman's own fantasized genealogy addresses ambivalence about her Jewishness, which as a child she had had to conceal to avoid persecution and death. Thus, I argue that Kofman's abjection of Judaism is crucial to the construction of her Jewish identity in the context of the Nazi occupation-that at the heart of all identification is ambivalence. Finally, I address her defense of Nietzsche's position(s) on the Jews in Le Mépris des Juifs. With reference to the Kleinian theory that will already have informed the previous two sections, I will argue that Kofman performs a rescue and cleansing of herself along with Nietzsche in this work: separating the positive comments (or "nutriments") about the Jews from Nietzsche's anti-Semitic (polluted or poisoned) material, and then projecting this pollution onto the "bad breast" his mother and sister embodied. Kofman's commitment to Nietzschian philosophy can thus be comprehended in terms of his texts' ability to mobilize the very mechanism for ambivalence through which she attempts continually to rearticulate her subjectivity. Kofman sought to locate herself through the ambiguous image of the Jew found in Nietzsche's writings.
Reading Nietzsche I: explosions
Kofman indicated frequently the proximity of her philosophy to autobiography. For instance, in a 1986 interview, she insisted that her identification with the figures she reads was the sole constituent factor of her identity per se: that she has no "autobiography other than that which emerges from my bibliography" (Kofman and Jaccard 1986, 7; cited in Deutscher 1999, 159, Deutscher's translation) . Implicit in this statement is an understanding of identity as pastiche, lacking a substantial core: moreover, as only an accretion of identifications with others. Kofman would then own an identity only to the extent that she could enact her various identifications with the objects of her books. This would explain her preference for close reading as a mode of writing. If, reading Kofman, it feels as if she loses herself in her interpretations of the great philosophers, it is only because these close readings were her favored mode of "finding" herself. 4 likewise, Kofman turned this conception of identity to reading Nietzsche, by addressing the question of how he articulated his own identity in relation to those most primary figures of identification: his parents, his sister, and the philosophers in whose texts he dwelled for most of his life. In Explosions, Kofman notes that in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche begins by articulating his relation to his biological parents but then continues by fantasizing a genealogy consisting of various "great men" throughout european history. She makes the case that Nietzsche's method of reading philosophy required an unstable identification in which he invested himself in the philosopher, whom he simultaneously interpreted and constructed: "The types with which he . . . identifies are necessarily fictions which owe more to what Nietzsche is or will be than to those they are supposed to figure" (Kofman 1994a, 58) . The aim of this genealogical exercise would then be to establish "who he is"-ironically, in a manner that put into question the very notion of identity. Nietzsche used the autobiographical genre, she writes, in order to subvert it "in the most radical way. It is the strangest autobiographical text ever written, 'the most depersonalized' there is" (57). Nietzsche's so-called autobiography is "depersonalized," Kofman suggests, because within it Nietzsche presents himself not as a person, but as an explosive force fomented within the belly of european culture. Ecce Homo bears witness to Nietzsche's deconstruction of himself that he might release a capacity to deconstruct (or revalue) all values (52).
Kofman's central argument is that initially Nietzsche had to confuse himself with various great philosophical and cultural figures in order to accumulate and develop himself therein; and the metaphor with which Kofman framed her understanding of this process is that of gestation.
5 accordingly, in all texts prior to Ecce Homo, Nietzsche was impregnating Schopenhauer, Socrates, Wagner, Dionysus, and Christ with a seed that would grow to become "Nietzsche." In these texts, Nietzsche reflected upon, drew from, and sparred with these various figures. Yet he was only preparing himself for the task to come: the revaluation of all values. With the text of Ecce Homo, Kofman tells us, Nietzsche ripened and then birthed himself, as it were, from them. With that text, Nietzsche thus demonstrated that these figures were merely "detours" by which he had to travel to reach his destiny: "masks" and "hiding-places" he needed to inhabit in order to amass the requisite energy for his own philosophical task.
In the interstices of Explosions, however, Kofman perhaps is attempting to birth herself by means of her reading of Nietzsche, and in relation to other figures as well, such as Freud and Derrida. "Kofman" would then be the hybrid progeny of a textual encounter that she arranges between these philosophers. Her interpretation of Nietzsche thus operates at multiple levels: on the surface, she describes a process whereby Nietzsche conceived himself in the bellies of the philosophers whom he read, but underlying her interpretation of Nietzsche is her own self-conception, for which she uses Nietzsche's text as her incubator. Kofman's account of Nietzsche's own "fantastic genealogy" elucidates the extent to which her texts about Nietzsche also represent her own "personal confession," and serve perhaps as "involuntary and unconscious memoir[s]" (Nietzsche 1886 (Nietzsche /1989 . To comprehend the extent of Kofman's identification with Nietzsche, and the degree to which her texts about Nietzsche are also about herself, let us turn to her discussion of Nietzsche's narrative about his relations-for which occasion she invites Freud to the family table.
Kofman elaborates Nietzsche's identification with the philosophers in terms of Freud's concept of "fantastic genealogy," or "the neurotic's family romance." The "family romance" refers to a process whereby a child, grown dissatisfied with his parents' imperfections, fantasizes for himself a better family so as to preserve his former idealization of the parents (Freud 1909 (Freud /1977 . What is interesting about Nietzsche's fantasized genealogy is that, according to Kofman, he replaced the mother instead of the father, most usually the target of the child's fantasized coup. Perhaps this was due to his father's premature death; simply, Nietzsche's early idealization of his father was never subjected to revision or contradicted by an actual, living father. To be sure, Nietzsche retained a highly idealized concept of his father, as a beautiful, ascetic priest: "delicate, kind, and morbid . . . more a gracious memory of life than life itself" (1908/1989, 222 ). Nietzsche's dead father thus joined the ranks of, and was augmented by, his fantasized genealogy of "great men"; whereas his mother-"bad-blooded" canaille (or "scoundrel") whom he associated with the German rabble (Kofman 1994b, 42) -was disavowed by his own role in birthing himself from these great men. Nietzsche thus took the place of his mother in this family romance, and his overvaluation of the father compensated for the deep ambivalence with which he regarded his mother, whose connection to him he could not simply abjure because "semper mater certissima est" (maternity is always certain) (Freud 1909 (Freud /1977 cited in Kofman 1994b, 39) .
Kofman traces this fantasized genealogy with reference to numerous circumstances cited by Nietzsche as "proof" of a noble lineage that would thereby distance him from the base, German origins with which he associated his mother. Such proof consists, for instance, of his father's birth falling on the day Napoleon arrived in Germany or that Nietzsche and King Wilhelm shared a birthday (Kofman 1994b, 40, 41) . Barely more realistically, Nietzsche hypothesized that he was descended from Polish aristocracy (the Nietzki counts who were expelled from Poland and may have ended up in Prussia). What is of importance to the fantasy structure of family romance, however, is not the prospect of an actual biological connection to the figures of identification, as much as a network of fortuitous circumstances into which the subject might interpellate himself.
To this end, Nietzsche downplayed and disparaged the importance of the biological connection, claiming that to identify with one's actual kin is a sign of degeneracy, whereas "true kinship is not of a physiological, but a typological order" (Kofman 1994b, 36, quotation on 48) . at the same time as he honored his paternal links to Polish and Prussian nobility, Kofman argues, Nietzsche further denigrated the German side of the family-the lineage he aligned with his mother and sister-suggesting that these connections represented precisely the parochial canaille that he felt had been infecting Germany.
6 according to Kofman, this schism between the maternal and paternal lineage signified a "double-inheritance," or internal dissonance, through which Nietzsche was able to rebirth himself (44). She thus identifies Ecce Homo as the text in which this rebirth occurs, by means of his double inheritance of life and death.
7 Nietzsche's dead father represented all that was decadent within him. He imagined his father to have provided him the "germ," or "homeopathic dose," by which he was able to diagnose and overcome a more ubiquitous cultural decadence. Kofman writes that the father "had gotten him pregnant" (38), but such pregnancy is a kind of death, which for Nietzsche related to Christianity and to the idealism of philosophers who attempt to determine concepts by sucking life dry. The "seed" that Nietzsche's father planted in his fertile body was a toxin that would require Nietzsche to develop as his own antibody a "counterideal sufficiently potent to combat the dominant ascetic ideal" (38). Specifically, Nietzsche incorporated-or identified with-his father, in order to undergo a dialectical process whereby he reversed his father's values. It was thus through his father that Nietzsche inherited his ability to say yes to life, but only after he had transformed his father into an idealized paternity by means of a fantasized lineage that included Napoleon, Goethe, and Friedrich Wilhelm of Prussia.
Hypatia
The living mother, conversely, was redeemed neither by Nietzsche nor by Kofman's rendering of his texts. Rather, insofar as she had given him life, she was abjured. Nietzsche thus did away with the need for his mother so that he could take her place in his own self-generation. 8 arguably, for this reason Nietzsche debased physiological kinship along with his own mother, refiguring birth in terms of "typological" genealogy. Birth was thus spiritualized, and gestation characterized as an energy that builds up to bursting point by means of repression.
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Through this spiritualized mode of birth-as an explosive force-Nietzsche "eliminated" his mother, along with "the rest" of the German rabble with which he associated her. Interestingly, notwithstanding Kofman's intimate engagement with psychoanalytic theory and her use of Freud to interpret Nietzsche, she stops short of analyzing Nietzsche's projective identification with his mother. Rather, along with him, she appears to identify Franziska Nietzsche with anti-Semitism and German nationalism, and in this sense, becomes complicit with Nietzsche's fantasy regarding his own birth, through which he constructed himself. Indeed, she is entirely uncritical of Nietzsche's use of the figure of the mother as a repository-or "bad breast"-into which he projected all pain and filth. It is therefore conceivable that Kofman has an interest in supporting Nietzsche's fantasy, and her own investment in his articulation of the bad-breasted mother. In order to appreciate the extent to which the mother must play this role for Kofman's reading of Nietzsche, I wish now to turn to her autobiographical text Rue Ordener, Rue Labat, in which we see her own life story bearing unsettling similarities to the narrative she provides for Nietzsche's life.
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Reading and Writing Her "Self": Rue ordener, Rue labat I would like now to suggest that Kofman's account of Nietzsche's family romance reflects as much about her own identity-and the fantasy structure that supports it-as Nietzsche's. We gain insight into this relation between Kofman and her reading of Nietzsche once we turn to her autobiographical writings, in particular Rue Ordener, Rue Labat. My reading of Kofman's life writing is informed by Kleinian object-relations theory, which claims that the infant manages its anxious relation to its environment through the mother's body. Briefly, according to Klein, the mother-or more precisely the mother's breast-represents to the child its entire world, and indeed is initially inseparable from itself (Klein 1987) . Infantile experience of the mother is bipolar, as she nurtures but is also the object of dread, in accordance with the vicissitudes of his inner life. as the source of all food, the breast is nutritious: thus the child imagines that this "good breast" is the source of all their own goodness. Yet when their appetite is frustrated, or as a result of indigestion, the child also fantasizes a "bad breast" polluting and attacking them. Into this bad breast the child projects all aspects of their own experience that they find intolerable: thus the mother mediates the child's relation not only to their environment, but also to their self. By employing a Kleinian analysis to Kofman's narrative, I intend to elucidate the deep ambivalence that accompanies any identification: but in particular, Kofman's troubled relation to Nietzsche is connected to her ambivalent identification with the parts of both Jew and anti-Semite, "represented" by the two mothers in her story.
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The narrative of Rue Ordener, Rue Labat is punctuated by scenes of feasting, conscientious abstinence from food (for example, food that is not kosher), and the expulsion of food (by vomiting). Rue Ordener is what might be called a "bulimic text," but in the background also dwell food controls and total prohibitions according to the Judaic dietary law as well as the rationing of food during wartime. 12 Kofman thus represents the boundary of self and other. By means of her relation to food, the young Sarah Kofman attempted to take control of her own life and her relation to others, at a point when everything had been taken from her.
13 This relation to food was a means by which she could control her anxiety, and within the narrative, it is a means for her to tell her story of dispossession and loss. Yet, Kofman's narrative also takes account of what she was reading at any particular point of the story, as well as various Jewish narratives that influenced how she made sense of her circumstances and the languages that were used and exchanged (Yiddish, Polish, and French). Thus it is not only food but also words that Kofman consumes and expels: words that, following Klein, take the place of the mother, if only provisionally, once anxiety regarding the mother comes to overwhelm the child.
The story begins with the removal of her father, the Rabbi Bereck Kofman, by the Vichy police; shortly after, we learn that he was murdered at auschwitz while praying, having refused to work on the Sabbath. Her siblings seek refuge in the country, but little Sarah will not be separated from her mother in Paris, and expresses this by refusing to eat whenever they are apart. She and her mother are subsequently taken in by a good Christian "lady" whom she calls Mémé: a French term of endearment for one's grandmother, but a word also curiously close to the Yiddish designation for "mother" (mamme or memme).
14 In fact, Mémé becomes for Kofman a fantasy mother, whom she positions as the "good mother" at key points in her narrative. For instance, Mémé finds a way to induce Sarah to eat pork, so that she better assimilates to Gentile society. and after Sarah has her tonsils removed, Mémé (as opposed to her actual mother) responds as a good mother should, in accordance with Wilfred Bion's description of a mother's function as modifying agent of a child's fear.
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When I was sick, Mémé, unlike my mother, never showed any sign of panic. after being put to sleep with a vial of chloroform, I wake up in the clinic where my tonsils have been removed; both women are at my bedside. I weep and cry out from pain.
My mother proceeds to talk very loudly, sympathizing with me in Yiddish, anxious to alert the doctor. Mémé, very calm and smiling, says, "It's nothing terrible! and besides, you'll get a lot of ice to suck on!" Immediately I stop crying. on that day I feel vaguely that I am detaching myself from my mother and becoming more and more attached to the other woman. (Kofman 1996, 43-44) The psychic exchange of fear for reassurance is accompanied by the promise of ice (a pleasant nutriment) to quell little Sarah's pain. The actual mother is reduced in the daughter's mind to a hysterical and frightening spectacle, speaking Yiddish rather than French-and thus threatening to expose them. Judaism itself is condemned along with the mother, Yiddish being the language of hysteria.
Kofman conveys clearly these connections between the good and bad mother, food, language, and culture. For instance, when Mémé suggests that by removing the blood from meat the kosher ritual of food preparation also removed the "goodness" from it (40), Kofman invests this statement with far more significance than it might appear at surface. For not only is the food connected to her mother-responsible for her nourishment-but also to her culture, already under threat by the Nazi regime from which Mémé conceals them. In effect, Mémé achieves a coup, replacing Sarah's mother as well as her culture. By lifting food prohibitions-which signal frustration, the bad breast 16 -Mémé offers herself in place of the mother's good breast. This initiates for Sarah an interest in Mémé's body as well, as if it were an imaginary food source: "To the amazement and irritation of my mother, she routinely walked around the apartment in pajamas, her chest uncovered, and I was fascinated by her breasts" (55).
When it came to leaving the apartment, it was most expedient for Kofman to pretend to be Mémé's daughter (40), dressed as a proper Parisian girl. In order to pass herself off as such, Sarah has to separate herself from her own mother, even at the level of affect. She begins to share intimacies with Mémé, and even gives her the nicer of the two Mother's Day cards she buys for that occasion (45). Sarah's assumption of the role as Mémé's daughter also represents the weakening of her ties to Judaism-through food, certainly, but also by means of words and labels that Mémé applies to Jews-and that Sarah comes to associate with her self (and wishes to extirpate). By invoking the stereotypes of Jewishness, Mémé ushers the young Kofman into the awareness of her Jewish specificity in relation to the rest of French society. In a sense, she produces the conditions for Sarah's interpellation of her Jewish self, but, significantly, not without also producing in her a degree of shame with regard to it. accordingly, Mémé-the good mother-also represents the origin of Kofman's ambivalence about all things with which she identifies.
She taught me that I had a Jewish nose and made me feel the little bump that was the sign of it. She also said, "Jewish food is bad for the health; the Jews crucified our savior, Jesus Christ; they are all stingy and love only money; they are very intelligent, no other people has as many geniuses in music and philosophy." Then she'd cite Spinoza, Bergson, einstein, Marx. It is from her lips and in that context that I first heard those names, which are so familiar to me today. (47) The basis of Mémé and Sarah's closeness concerns words and names as much as food. Bitter words, to be sure, laced with as much poison as nourishment.
17 and yet this was the diet that Kofman had to live on to survive the Nazi occupation of France. This intimacy between them-secured by the exchange of food and words-eventually led to the loss of Sarah's mother tongue: "I didn't think at all any more about my father, and I couldn't pronounce a single word in Yiddish" (57). Her assumption of the French culture thus apparently involved the loss of her Jewish identity, of which her father is emblematic in this passage.
Yet Sarah is also marked by her Jewishness-the bump on her nose, as well as the innate potential for either evil or genius-and so never feels herself to occupy a rightful place in French society, to the extent that she is Jewish. Because she had had to abjure her Jewish identity in order to survive, Kofman's subject position involved a repudiation of Judaism that reinforced as much as concealed her identification as Jewish. like the mother's body, Judaism is both internalized and rejected to produce in Kofman an unstable identity, which is subject to continual revision in relation to this most ambivalent object: the Jewish mother.
The Death of the Mother
Rue Ordener, Rue Labat opens with Kofman's father's disappearance and death and closes with the death of Mémé. after peace is restored to France and an acrimonious custody battle has been fought between her mother and Mémé, Kofman turns to Mémé's funeral, which, for reasons untold, she did not attend. The presiding priest, however, remembered her to the congregation. She writes: "I was unable to attend her funeral. But I know that at her grave the priest recalled how she had saved a little Jewish girl during the war" (85). Kofman had by this time grown disenchanted with Mémé and of being interpellated into her version of their story: "I can't stand to hear her talk about the past all the time or to let her keep calling me her 'little bunny' or her 'little darling' " (84). In a sense, the narrative of Rue Ordener represents her own critique of Mémé's narrative, albeit a faithful critique: that is, a critique that puts into question Mémé's role as the good mother only between the lines of her writing.
Hypatia
Two prominent deaths serve as bookends to Kofman's narrative, and yet she does not acknowledge a third death, that of her mother, from whom she could not bear to be separated at the beginning of the story. What role does such an omission play in Kofman's narrative of her life? In fact, Kofman does refer, fleetingly, to her mother's death, but only instrumentally, in order to underscore the event of a second, symbolic loss of her father. "When my mother died, it wasn't possible to find that card [the last the father had written to the family], which I had reread so often and wanted to save. It was as if I had lost my father a second time" (9).
Kofman thus misses the occasion to mark the loss of her mother. Perhaps unwittingly, however, she implicitly indicates her mother's importance to her identity late in Rue Ordener. as Kofman recounts, après coup, 18 after watching alfred Hitchcock's The Lady Vanishes, she feels a "visceral anguish" when the nice "Mrs. Froy" (Freud? ) is replaced by a second, cruel-looking woman: "The bad breast in place of the good, the one utterly separate from the other, the one changing into the other" (66). Her horror at this replacement suggests the work of abjection: a moment that is obviously significant in terms of the articulation of her identity, and the function that the relation to her mother has for such a construction. Yet it seems that Kofman can only acknowledge the loss of her mother and the impact it has upon her when such recognition is expressed by the narrative of another: in this case Hitchcock.
Her own narrative refuses to comprehend the loss of the mother; moreover, her loss is rendered manifest precisely by this refusal. In this respect, the abjection of the mother represents the point of pure pain about which the narrative revolves but cannot encounter. In order to experience the painful fact of the relation to her mother, Kofman must disguise it from herself within the other's account, where it then becomes the object of her contemplation at a safe distance. Kofman's modus operandi throughout her oeuvre was to take refuge in this manner within the other's narrative or fantasy. and as I will demonstrate in the section that follows, this is exactly what occurs in her reading of Nietzsche. In Kleinian terms, Kofman's failure to achieve reparation-specifically, her guilt regarding the abjection of her mother and later the mother's unacknowledged death-is refigured within her treatment of Nietzsche's text and projected into his fantasized genealogy. The elision of the mother thus also performs a signifying function, representing a loss that Kofman could not write, which thereby kept her needing to "write, write" herself through the discourse initiated by other figures with which she could identify.
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alongside her own autobiography, Kofman's last writing projects concerned Nietzsche: a two-volume undertaking on Nietzsche's "autobiography," Ecce Homo, and a response to the accusations against him of anti-Semitism. 20 Nietzsche's and Kofman's life writing thereby touch upon each other as she reflects upon her own self through her study of Nietzsche's writing-and unwriting-of himself. as she states in Explosions, "What the text [Ecce Homo] 'recounts' is the death of the autos as a stable and substantial subject, as conceived by metaphysics; it is also the death of the 'bios,' if one takes this to mean that the 'life' of a living person has its origin in his two parents to whom he is bound by his 'blood ' (1994a, 60-61) .
Nietzsche and Kofman share a reservation regarding their bios, understood as the binds of blood through which the living person is engendered. Hence, perhaps, their attraction to the philosophical text, through which the living person may be transformed or rebirthed according to an alternative parentage of their choosing. Nietzsche is in this way as much an element of Kofman's fantasy life as the ideal reader whom she had hoped to embody was for Nietzsche's 21 : and so their relation might be characterized in terms of transference and countertransference. They are bound to each other psychically, and the object of exchange between them is the abject mother, whose concealment organizes their shared fantasy.
What this means is that Kofman's stake in reading Nietzsche-the ambiguous pleasure she derives from his text-is situated in the irresolvable question of her own identity. Nietzsche's texts offer Kofman a stage not only for her identity but also the destruction of her self. Kofman's attraction to Nietzsche is equal to the anxieties his texts could provoke within her regarding the "sites" of her interpellated identity, as Jewish and also as woman. For it must be admitted, Nietzsche offers no easy identification for women or Jews who come to his texts. Rather, it is an identification for which the reader must pay-the higher the price perhaps also the richer (and more complex) the identification. The final section of this essay considers Kofman's attempt to address precisely Nietzsche's position on the Jews, which I read here in terms of the exigencies conferred upon her as Nietzsche's ideal reader. accordingly, I read Mépris des Juifs in the light of the concept of fantastic genealogy discussed earlier.
Reading Nietzsche II: le Mépris des Juifs: Nietzsche, les Juifs, l'anti-Semitisme Le Mépris des Juifs was Kofman's last book on Nietzsche, and the one she wrote in closest proximity to Rue Ordener, Rue Labat.
22 Both were her last contributions to philosophy and to life; and both focus upon the politics of being Jewish in a culture of anti-Semitism. In this section, I bring together Kofman's concern to untangle Nietzsche's position on the Jews and her preoccupation with the possibility of writing (and unwriting) the self. More precisely, I will demonstrate that Kofman's relation to Nietzsche and her relationship with Mémé are structurally similar, in that both were formative of her unstable identity as a Jew. Nietzsche's characterization of Judaism and Jews, like Mémé's, is deeply equivocal: not only positive and negative in turn, but also sometimes within the same moment. 23 My contention is that Mépris des Juifs represents Kofman's attempt to resolve her own ambivalence about being Jewish by minimizing tension in Nietzsche's account of the Jews. and in the background of her identification with Nietzsche, Kofman negotiates a difficult relation to her own repudiated mother, whom she aligns both to the base canaille Nietzsche's mother represents and to that elusive Jewishness she wishes to salvage from Nietzsche's text.
as suggested already, Kleinian object-relations theory informs my reading of Mépris des Juifs here, in particular the relation to the bad breast-the figure of excess for which the anti-Semite stands in Kofman's text. However, we can also understand Kofman's identification with Nietzsche and her defense of his position on the Jews in terms of interpellation. Judith Butler discusses the interpellative power of pejorative uses of language when she writes: "The address constitutes a being within the possible circuit of recognition and, accordingly, outside of it, in abjection" (1997a, 5) . 24 Because the subject, or what Butler terms "the social existence of the body" (5), owes the fact of its very existence to the other's designation of it, being called a "bad name" evokes a visceral sensation of threat. according to Butler, if language confers existence, it can also withdraw it by displacing the subject from the context in which she knows herself: "one can be 'put in one's place' by such speech, but such a place may be no place" (4).
We could understand Kofman's project in Mépris des Juifs accordingly-to show that Nietzsche was not anti-Semitic-in terms of a need to retain her place in relation to him, a place that she might have to relinquish if she were to take the possibility of his racism seriously. Yet perhaps in the case of Sarah Kofman, we can also conceive of vilification as an ambiguous (and unacknowledged) source of pleasure. Kofman was first given her "place" in French society precisely by virtue of her vilification. Hence, perhaps, she is not simply displaced by abuse leveled at the fact of her being Jewish, in the manner that Butler indicates above. Rather, her identity intrinsically involved the threat of expulsion from society; and her interpellation was founded upon a prior repudiation of her Jewish self. In this way, Kofman's attraction to Nietzsche can be understood as heightened instead of simply frustrated by the fact that his texts provide no clear place for the Jewish reader. or more precisely, the feelings of frustration evoked by exclusion enhance the appeal of Nietzsche's text for her.
For this reason, Kofman's response to the excessive figure of the Jew in Nietzsche's text-both attractive and repulsive-is of interest here. However, what also emerges from her engagement with Nietzsche in Mépris des Juifs is the extent to which "the Jew" played a pivotal role for Nietzsche's identity, as an excessive and unstable category into which he projected his own anxieties. Thus we can read Mépris des Juifs as the site of a transference and countertransference between Kofman and Nietzsche, in which Kofman manages her identity by means of Nietzsche's text and the specter of the anti-Semitic reader, while Nietzsche articulates his own in relation to the shadow of the Jewish reader. If we read the engagement between Kofman and Nietzsche in terms of this exchange of psychic material in fantasy, we may understand her, perversely, to have a better claim than most to the role of the "ideal reader"-but only once the essential instability of this position is conceded.
The concern Kofman takes up in Mépris des Juifs is very specific. The text deals with Nietzsche's statements about the Jews and Judaism, weighing them against one another in order to determine his final, overall position. even at only ninety-four pages, it is a scholarly work, heavy with citation, and it appears that Kofman intended the book to resolve the question of the Jew in Nietzsche once and for all. Kofman acknowledges the existence of anti-Semitic uses of Nietzsche's work, but is quick to quash any credibility to which they might lay claim. She writes, Without a doubt, certain texts, taken out of context, isolated from the whole of the corpus and from all reference, mounted on a pin and, what is more, that are falsified, when they fall in the hands of men of a certain type (their frog perspective renders them inept to see and understand well) could have been able to attribute to a misinterpretation and to a dangerous, scandalous reappropriation. It is, Nietzsche knew, the destiny of all good books. (Kofman 1994c, 12, my translation) Thus, she argues, his philosophy will appear anti-Semitic only to those who cannot attain to its heights; it implicitly excludes those lowly types who are without the subtlety of taste to detect the critique of the notions of blood and race that grounds his prelude to a higher culture. The notion of 'type' represents Kofman's best line of defense against anti-Semitism because it provides an alternative to a politics of "race" or "blood" invoked by the anti-Semitic reader. Yet also, as we saw in Explosions, it furnishes Nietzsche his "escape route" from ties to his blood relations. Kofman exploits both uses of the term in Mépris des Juifs, and I soon turn to her enlargement of these mechanisms. What I would like to emphasize here is the cursory and unconditional manner in which Kofman rejects the legitimacy of the anti-Semitic interpretation of Nietzsche. Paradoxically, the anti-Semitic reader whom Kofman so reviles is a necessary element of the reading she goes on to construct of Nietzsche as pro-Semitic. along with the mother, the "bad" reader is a figure of excess into which she can project any racism remnant of Nietzsche's work. accordingly, Nietzsche's philosophy requires the racist "misinterpretation" that then renders the service of containing the "good" reader's uncertainty about Nietzsche's position on Judaism.
Notwithstanding the certainty of her conclusions about Nietzsche's position respecting the Jews, Kofman begins Mépris des Juifs by indicating and even celebrating his ambivalence toward the Jew, claiming that his occupation of various perspectives was his means of playing out, within his own body, the european struggle with the "Jewish question." No one yet, she writes, has found the solution to the Jews' "enigmatic strangeness " (1994c, 11) . 25 In order to work through the Jewish question, she reasons, Nietzsche "impregnated" himself with it before he could rebirth himself as a Jew. The nature of this pregnancy was then an ambivalence that would condition the possibility of being Jewish not only for Nietzsche but also for Kofman through her reading of his texts. For Kofman, Nietzsche thus presented himself as the answer to this perennial question. It is worth noting, however, that the existence of this insoluble Jewish question, toward which Kofman gestures (but which she does not examine) suggests the work of projection. as Slavoj Žižek demonstrates in The Sublime Object of Ideology, the figure of the Jew has long been (and continues to be) the site of fantasy in the West, much to the detriment of actual Jews:
In the anti-Semitic perspective, the Jew is precisely a person about whom it is never clear 'what he really wants' ['Che vuoi?'] -that is, his actions are always suspected of being guided by some hidden motives (the Jewish conspiracy, world domination and the moral corruption of Gentiles, and so on). . . . The answer to 'What does the Jew want?' is a fantasy of 'Jewish conspiracy': a mysterious power of Jews to manipulate events, to pull the strings behind the scenes. (1989, 114) The Jew, like the mother, is positioned as the enigmatic other whose voracious desire threatens subjectivity, simply because it does not accord to the law that interpellates us or with respect to which we know our place.
In this context, Judaism is understood as what lacks a place in the system, and thus portends its collapse. The "enigma of the Jews" signifies an anxiety regarding a people who appear to exist outside the law by which we are interpellated, and thereby to threaten that law. on the one hand, they become the site of fantasy whereby the subject projects the "secret" of his self: that is, discarded psychic material he cannot recognize as his own. on the other hand, the fantasy of the "Jewish conspiracy"-or that Jews possess innate properties, such as deviousness, avarice, or genius-fills the gap opened by the suggestion that the law does not already encompass all that exists. In Mépris des Juifs, Kofman joins Nietzsche in an idealization of Jews that renders them outside of any possible interpellation.
The narrative Kofman presents in Mépris des Juifs ostensibly traces Nietzsche's "convalescence" from his early anti-Semitism to his eventual transformation into a Jew so that he may attain to his destiny. Kofman aligns anti-Semitism with his female relations (as well as such early "influences" as Wagner and Schopenhauer) and invokes, again, the "fantastic genealogy," as the mechanism by which Nietzsche separates himself from these figures and, accordingly, anti-Semitism:
His contempt for the Germans of the Reich led him to repudiate, on the maternal side, all Germanic parentage that risked assimilating him to this canaille and to these base instincts. and to forge a fantastic genealogy, a "family romance," which would electively confer to him higher and nobler origins. of his mother and sister, belonging to the side of the canaille, he declared himself to have such a horror that he preferred even to renounce his most abysmal thought rather than envisage the possibility of their eternal return. (Kofman 1994c, 15-16 , my translation) 26 It remains . . . to recall that the one who signs these texts with the single name of Nietzsche has not actualized himself in his "purity" and his "unity," that it is after all a selective and cathartic operation; a work of emancipation and of the repudiation of his identificatory models; after a divorce from those to whom he was at first symbiotically united. We have seen this in our lecture on Ecce Homo [Explosions], the becoming "Nietzsche" of "Nietzsche," the accomplishment of the "promise" that he would make himself by conquering his own soil and his secret garden, by (re)birthing himself, implying a severance of the umbilical cord with Germany of the Reich, with his mother and sister, and with his paternal substitutes who had been, among others, Wagner and Schopenhauer. and thus, with the frenzied anti-Semitism that characterizes them. (76, my translation)
The consistent thesis throughout the book is that the project of "becoming what he is" so central to Nietzsche's philosophy involved separating himself from his (anti-Semitic) friends and relations. In this manner, we can explain Nietzsche's regard for the Jews in terms of the fantasy structure Kofman elucidates in Explosions. Nietzsche was born of anti-Semitism but presented himself as its antidote. as with his relation to the father-"dead" inside him-anti-Semitism was the sickness Nietzsche from which convalesced, thus rendering himself the stronger for having fended it off.
We might then ask, what is Kofman's own investment in Nietzsche's convalescence from anti-Semitism? and does Kofman, with her reading of Nietzsche, also inoculate herself against hatred of the Jews? Indeed, if we take seriously the hypothesis that Kofman identifies with Nietzsche, we can read the book as her own attempt to birth herself as a Jew through the figure of Nietzsche. There are a number of "fortuitous circumstances" that could support Kofman's identification with Nietzsche, and Kofman emphasizes these coincidences when relating his story and her own. Kofman's portrayal of her father as having died while praying, for instance, maps well onto Nietzsche's pious and idealized father's life as "more a gracious memory of life than life itself" (1908/1989, 222) . Moreover, according to Kofman's accounts, both she and Nietzsche credited their vocation as writers to an inheritance their absent father left to them: Nietzsche was "impregnated" with his father's decadence and thus invented the revaluation of values as its counter-ideal; Kofman was, in a manner of speaking, "impregnated" by her father's pen, with which she generated her sundry writings (Kofman 1996, 3) . equally, however, there is an unacknowledged relation between Kofman's representation of Nietzsche's mother and of her own. For instance, in a move all too familiar to those who study Nietzsche, Kofman charges Nietzsche's mother with responsibility for the anti-Semitic aftertaste one has in the wake of reading Nietzsche. In Mépris des Juifs, Nietzsche's transition from anti-Semite to Jewish advocate is attended by a rejection of his mother, according to Kofman. But while Nietzsche's mother is cast as the anti-Semitism Nietzsche must overcome, Kofman's own mother represents an unassimilable remainder of "Jewishness" that she must cast off in order to survive the Holocaust. Kofman's portrayal of her mother throughout her autobiographical writings, and in interviews, is abject: like Franziska Nietzsche, Kofman's mother (whom she does not name) personifies all that she must repudiate. During the war, this is Judaism; later, Kofman's mother represents a barrier to her intellectual accomplishment. 27 With each of these maternal figures, then, we find instances of the "bad mother" in whom, according to Klein, the child projects whatever pain or discomfort he cannot otherwise endure. Kofman comfortably identifies with neither the stereotype of the Jewish woman nor the anti-Semite; and yet she also constitutes her self by means of a certain projective identification with each of these poles. The two mothers thus occupy the place of the extreme in relation to which Kofman must continually differentiate herself to maintain her "moderate" identity, as "Parisian Jew."
What is interesting about Kofman's treatment of Nietzsche's family relations, then, is the manner in which it articulates her relation to her own mother and to Judaism. Not only does she use Nietzsche's life to stage her own story but she also employs the interplay of Nietzsche's varied statements about the Jews to bring her into a more tolerable relation to her own culture and identity. In this respect, like Mémé, Nietzsche's text modifies material that she encounters only with horror in the personage of her own nameless mother. Kofman's mother embodies her negativity about being Jewish, which at one time may have been synonymous with social alienation and death. once interpellated into Mémé's narrative, Kofman sees her mother only in terms of her "failure" to comfort, shelter, and nourish; accordingly, the Gentile other was in a position to save her. In this context, we can make sense of Kofman's failure to disclose her mother's name. For in the european imagination, the figure of the Jew garners its horrifying power by virtue of its existence outside of the law; that is, outside of interpellation. Kofman is thus better able to stage her identity with reference to Nietzsche's pantomime of birthing himself as a Jew through which he attempts to appropriate the Jews' "enigmatic strangeness."
Kofman thus joins Nietzsche in constructing a fantasy of the enigmatic Jew, each attempting to appropriate a lost part of their selves reflected (or projected) in this fantasy. Without deviating from racist stereotypes, they articulate this figure of the Jew as mercurial, inscrutable, and equivocal, "positioning" it as what evades the structures that contain identity. Both Kofman and Nietzsche claim to seek the dissolution of subjectivity, so the figure of "the Jew"-as what has no place-adequately symbolizes this aim. Yet the way in which they enact this gesture to "the Jew" does not actually lead to a relinquishment of identity. on the contrary, it is an attempt to recover a lost part of the self abjected in the other; to colonize the other rather than divest the self. For this reason, it should be kept in mind when reading Mépris des Juifs that Kofman's own "contempt for the Jews"-or at least a confusion and ambivalence about being Jewish-guides her thought in this text.
as Kofman's attempt to resolve the question of anti-Semitism in Nietzsche's texts, Mépris des Juifs marks the point at which we can see her participating in the familial romance that in Explosions she only described. Her stake in Nietzsche's fantasy concerns the repudiation of her own anti-Semitism, understood as both an effect and a precondition of Jewish subjectivity in Vichy France. Her attempt to clear Nietzsche's name is thus symptomatic of an effort to absolve herself of anti-Semitism. It must be remembered, however, that what attracted Kofman to Nietzsche in the first place was precisely the ambivalence he exhibited toward the Jews. The ambiguity of Nietzsche's position fascinated Kofman because it represented a piece of herself she refused to recognize as her own. In this way, the renunciation of the two mothers-her own as well as Nietzsche's, representing Judaism and anti-Semitism respectively-is a manner of keeping this piece of the self in reserve; and it is accessed by reading and writing about Nietzsche who, like Mémé, trades in stereotypes of the "good" and "bad" Jew. In this respect, Nietzsche's accounts of Judaism provide Kofman with the double bind she had come to associate with her identity as Jewish: an identity that could be affirmed only in its repudiation.
Kofman's readiness to be transformed by Nietzsche's philosophy-that is, to operate according to its terms-can be attributed equally to her commitment to her personal mode of philosophizing and to the very personal tonality with which Nietzsche's texts address her as their reader. Her intimacy with Nietzsche was afforded by an ambivalence that quite literally split her in two, according to exigencies indicated by the text itself. Nietzsche's hook for Kofman was his equivocal depiction of the tropes with which she identified as a woman and a Jew. Nietzsche thus took a piece of Kofman's flesh with him in this encounter, such that it was his writings to which she turned in order to find her lost self. This mode of addressing the reader appealed already to Kofman's proclivity for putting herself on the line for her philosophy. at work in her writings is a performance of identity as a fragile, incomplete, and transitory structure that must continually rearticulate itself in relation to its others and equivocate between incompatible extremes. Her attempts to reconcile these extremes, which both disrupt and constitute her identity, organize her philosophy, and to this extent render it continuous with her life narrative. It is a volatile continuity, however, constituting a porosity of boundary between Kofman and the philosophers in whom she invests herself. Nietzsche, for his part, indicated a wary admiration for his Jewish readers, or at least the one of which he was most aware, Danish scholar Georg Brandes. It is uncertain what he would have made of the fact that so many of his most well-known readers since his death have been Jewish, or the emergence in the past few decades of interest in his work by feminist theorists.
28 What is clear is that Nietzsche's curious fascination for 'woman' and for the 'Jewish type'-and the pivotal place he awarded these "types" in the elaboration of his fantasy-has been reciprocated by an equally fascinated body of Jewish and feminist readers, captured by those fishhooks left for them in his texts: fishhooks through which they attempt to answer the insoluble question of their own identity. In light of this collusion of fantasies, Sarah Kofman's fascination for Nietzsche was perhaps inevitable; a necessary component of her destiny as a Jewish femme-philosophe.
Notes
I would like to acknowledge The Institute for advanced Study at la Trobe university for their support during the writing of this article.
Books include Kofman 1979 , 1985 , 1990 , 1. 1992 , 1993a . See also 1994a , 1994b , 1993b , 1994c , 1995a , and 1995b . articles and portions of books reprinted and translated in journals include Kofman 1976 Kofman , 1986a Kofman , 1986b Kofman , 1986c Kofman , 1987 Kofman , and 1996 as Duroux (1999, 136) suggests, Kofman contravenes philosophical mores by 2. taking an interest in philosophers' lives, and how the life is related to the philosophy, restoring philosophical theories "to their conditions of production, not only the historical and social ones, which would be acceptable in their 'objectivity,' but also the subjective ones." I am not the first to have conjectured this: Deutscher 1999 provides an excellent 3. exposition of Kofman's relation to her textual "father-figures," Nietzsche, Freud, and Derrida, demonstrating how Kofman constructed her identity by mimicking her own various stylized depictions of Freud and Nietzsche.
Kofman's ability to differentiate her own voice from that of the text she reads 4. has been a point of debate among her readers. Her status, as a philosopher or as a mere commentator, remains under discussion; and even her ability to produce the "faithful" reading of the text to which she lays claim has been questioned. With reference to other critics' reception of Kofman's interpretations, see Deutscher (2000, 168) .
For instance, where she writes, "The figure, figureheads for Nietzsche, are all 5. chimerical creations, enriched and impregnated by him: 'Nietzsche in front, Nietzsche behind, chimera in the middle.' They are all big with Nietzsche, with the Nietzsche they will bring into the world, the Nietzsche to come who has no name yet" (Kofman 1994a, 58) .
Nietzsche even designates his female relatives by the confused label, "venomous 6. vermin," evoking both "a swarming proliferating population of which one must, with great difficulty, rid oneself," and "dreadful-tongued serpents who wound cruelly and infallibly, disarming the victim of any strength for self-defense" (1994b, 43). Significantly, Kofman notes here that Hitler used the vermin metaphor to mobilize public sentiment against the Jews. Kofman presents this as a quick aside in her text, but a deeper connection lurks beneath this association: namely, that for Kofman, Nietzsche, and Hitler must at some point coincide; and that in facing Nietzsche, she also faces the specter of anti-Semitism as such. Kofman suggests that this "venomous" attack on his mother and sister represses his deep love for them. "This 'horror' is so 'unspeakable' (unsägliches Grauen) that it can only be the flip side of a more or less forbidden love, for which it functions as a counterinvestment" (43). I would suggest that this indicates the extent of Nietzsche's ambivalence toward his mother and sister, as well as what they represented to him (German nationalism, anti-Semitism). However, Kofman seems content merely to point out that, after all, Nietzsche did love his mother, and that this reflects pleasingly on his relation to women in general (50). Kofman seems to continue Nietzsche's attack on his mother and sister, scapegoating them for any anti-Semitic resonances that his text bears, and admonishing elisabeth for her editing of his text, and for Hitler's later support of Nietzsche's work.
This "double-inheritance" refers to the first section of 7.
Ecce Homo, "Why I am So Wise," where Nietzsche delineates between two aspects of his being-that which is "still living and becoming old," from his mother, and that he is "already dead" by virtue of his father. Thus he represents for philosophy, and for european culture, "at the same time a decadent and a beginning" (1908/1989, 222) .
oliver suggests "matricide" as a figure for Nietzsche's relation to his mother, in 8. her reading of Explosions (1999, .
She writes: "Birth is conceived as the result of an accumulation of energy neces-9. sitating the build up of a capital that will burst forth or explode all the more strongly for the time it is kept in check. Time permits the selection of the most forceful force, and the elimination of all the rest" (Kofman 1994b, 48) .
I consider the similarities between Kofman's writing about Nietzsche and her own 10. biography to be "unsettling" because Kofman committed suicide on the 150th anniversary of Nietzsche's birth. This fact is known by most who study her work, although few commentaries discuss its significance, with the notable exception of Schrift 1999.
The possibility of reading 11.
Rue Ordener through Kleinian theory has been indicated already in other responses to the text. For instance, Deutscher (1999, 160) and oliver (1999, 186) each draw attention to the figures of the good and bad mother in the text, but neither mentions Klein by name. However, oliver does discuss the work in connection to Kristeva's Powers of Horror, citing Kristeva's point that if the paternal law is symbolized through food prohibitions, then "this means that mothers who are enforcing paternal law in their kitchens are enforcing a prohibition against their own bodies" (188). This Kristevan intervention also accords to what a Kleinian interpretation might look like: the once full breast then begins to frustrate the child by withdrawing itself from her-the good breast turns into the bad breast. Robson (2004) invokes Klein explicitly with reference to Kofman's preoccupation with the traffic of material (food and vomit) that is continuously consumed and projected throughout the course of her narrative. according to Robson, Rue Ordener mobilizes the body as a figure to represent trauma: the limits of narrative; or whatever resists the narrative account. The body is thus both "within" and "without" language for Kofman; as if a violent interloper, threatening to disrupt the conventions by which we understand the autobiographical account.
These prohibitions are represented as very meaningful in 12.
Rue Ordener: for instance, when Sarah's kind teacher gives her more than her ration of milk, she vomits all over the school-room floor (Kofman 1996, 21 Bion developed Klein's account of the relation between the mother and baby, 15. whereby (in the best-case scenario) the mother is able to "contain" the child's projected anxiety, before returning it to the child in a "modified"-palatable-form, to be reintrojected. "From the infant's point of view [the mother] should have taken into her, and thus experienced, the fear that the child was dying. It was this fear that the child could not contain. He strove to split it off together with the part of the personality in which it lay and project it into the mother. an understanding mother is able to experience the feeling of dread, that this baby was striving to deal with by projective identification, and yet retain a balanced outlook" (1967, 104) . This is a paradigm of communication, according to Bion, and provides a model for the role that the analyst performs for the analysand.
oliver makes this point (1999, 185) . 16.
For instance, the crossword puzzles they do together, the books Mémé gives her, 17. the dictation exercises Mémé makes her do, and their deciphering of english secret messages on the radio. In fact, I wonder if Kofman's fascination for riddles and enigmas (see oliver 1999, 182) might not have its origin in these intimate word games that she played with Mémé.
Kofman hints at a deeper connection between her experience with Mémé and her connection to philosophy, where she describes a night they spent in a hotel room together, and Mémé undressed behind a screen. Kofman was fascinated by the idea of her breasts, and writes, "I have no memory of that night in the hotel, save of that undressing scene behind the mahogany screen" (1996, 55) . Given Kofman's interest in the "enigma" of woman in Freud's work, and in the action of veils and sails in Nietzsche's, we can read this passage as Kofman reflecting upon the genealogy of her own philosophy.
Kofman frequently uses the phrase 18.
après coup in her work to designate a perspective on an event that can only come into view afterward. It is always also an implicit reference to Freud, as it is the French translation of Nachträglichkeit, meaning retro-, or deferred, action. See large's footnote 43 to his translation of Kofman's Explosion I (1994) .
In the opening paragraph to 19.
Rue Ordener, Kofman attributes her need to "write, write" to her failure to encounter her father's death. In this respect, I am deliberately reinterpreting the impetus for her to write through the loss of the mother rather than the father.
Kofman insisted that, with regard to 20.
Ecce Homo, the nomination "autobiography" must always be placed in quotation marks.
Kofman opened a section of 21.
Explosion II: Les Enfants des Nietzsche: "Suppose that an ideal reader of Nietzsche could some day exist" (1995, 173) , and then proceeds to elaborate Nietzsche's "selection criteria" for the ideal reader. I would suggest that an attempt to approximate the part of the ideal reader is an element of Kofman's engagement with Nietzsche, or the shared fantasy through which they encounter one another.
Le Mépris des Juifs 22.
can be translated as either "contempt for the Jews" or "contempt of the Jews." This title is therefore of particular interest at a number of levels, as it refers at once to Nietzsche's complex relation to the Jews, and to Kofman's Jewish identity, and to the French anti-Semitism that was allowed free expression during her childhood, and then subjected to a somewhat fragile repression after the war. Most obviously, Kofman addresses this title to Nietzsche, as a question to his own stance regarding the Jews. But if we attend to both meanings at once (for/of), it also represents her own ambivalence ("contempt of the Jews for the Jews," or the Jewish part of her self). The title possibly also addresses her French contemporaries, who were so easily led to betray their Jewish countrymen, but with whom she had to make an uneasy peace. It is likely that the sense of betrayal originating in her childhood would frequently have been reactivated throughout her life. I would like to thank one of Hypatia's anonymous readers of this article for pointing out to me this equivocation within the book's title.
other commentators both prior to and since Kofman's study have thoroughly 23. interrogated Nietzsche's ambivalent references to the Jews and Judaism (eisen 1986; Duffy and Mittelman 1988; aschheim 1996 , 1997 Schrift 1999) , and there is at least one edited collection that deals primarily with this subject (Golomb 1997) . along with the question of his intellectual relation to Nazism and his critique of feminism and democracy, Nietzsche's stance on the Jews has been a burning issue for Nietzsche studies over the past three decades. In this light, Kofman's study is far from revolutionary in its treatment of Nietzsche on the Jews, and recapitulates a number of earlier moves-for instance, in claiming that there is a marked difference between Nietzsche's earlier and more mature opinions (Duffy and Mittelman 1988) , and that his early anti-Semitism was largely due to the influence of family and friends (eisen 1986). Furthermore, Duffy and Mittelman 1988; aschheim 1996 , 1997 and Schrift 1999 present a far more nuanced understanding of differences between "types" of Jews represented within Nietzsche's work: for instance, that he valued nineteenth-century european Jews and early old Testament Jews, but was critical of the prophetic Jews of the later old Testament, seeing them as proto-Christians and as marking the beginning of the slave revolt in morality. Given the caliber of her earlier works on Nietzsche, Kofman's marked lack of innovation in Mépris des Juifs is significant, and perhaps supports my own argument presented below, that the book represents a deeply personal journey through his texts, in search of her own identity.
